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IN THE SUPRElt1E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l" . .[-\.ROLINE E. CHU~INEY. 
<l b a SUN REALTY CO .. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLEON B. S'l.,O'"f'l, and ZIN A 





Appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge 
ST.c\.'fE~I:EN'l' OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action \vas broug·ht by the Plaintiff to recover 
a 6~( sales commission as established in an exclusive sales 
agency contract "·hen the owner sold the listed property 
during· the life of the agreement to a third party pur-
chaser not procured by the Plaintiff. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR1, 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, found in favor of the Plaintiff in 
the sum of $4,950.00 plus $15.60 costs and $708.33 
attorneys fees. 
RELIEJ1~ SOUGH'l, ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiff and a finding of no cause of action on 
the Plaintiff's claim or in the alternative that the cause 
be remanded to the District Court for further proceed-
ings to establish the actual damages the Plaintiff may 
be entitled to for services rendered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Caroline E. Chumney, is a duly 
licensed real estate broker in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
doing business as Sun Realty Company. On or about 
the 8th day of June, 1960, Cleon B. Stott and Zina Stott 
and Raymond E. Howes entered into a sales agency 
contract wherein the Defendants listed with the Plain-
tiff a parcel of business property identified as 4045 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. In part the 
agreement provided: "During the life of this contract-
if said property or any part thereof is sold, leased or 
exchanged during said term by myself or any other 
person, fir1n or corporation, I agree to pay you the 
commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board for such sale, lease or exchange." 
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'fhe ter1n of the listing \Vas from June 8, 1960, to 
Decetnber 8, 1960, and on or about August 2, 1960, 
the Defendants sold the property to two purchasers 
for $78,000.00. Said buyers were not procured, pro-
duced or in any way found by the Plaintiff. The Plain-
tiff ran t\\ro ads in a daily newspaper for a total of eight 
dnys and a cost of approximately $10.00. Further, the 
Plaintiff contacted or was contacted by approximately 
5 persons or firms and the Plaintiff estimated that the 
total time involved in these contacts and sales effort was 
~ or 5 days all told. Also, the Plaintiff procured a sign 
for some $20.00 and placed the same on the property. 
'fhe foregoing constitutes the sole expenses and effort 
expended by the Plaintiff in performing the sales agree-
ment herein. 
The Defendant Clean B. Stott died during April, 
1961, and the Defendant Zina Stott refused to pay the 
co1nmission contending that there had been an oral can-
cellation or recission of the agreement by the agent 
for the Plaintiff and Clean B. Stott, deceased. 1..,he 
case \\ras tried on April 19, 1962, after which the Honor-
able Joseph G. Jeppson found for the Plaintiff in the 
sum of $4,950.00 plus $15.60 costs and attorneys fees 
of $708.33. 'l.,he principal sum of said judgment \vas 
reached "~ithout reference to services performed by the 
Plaintiff and '"'as predicated upon the uniform estab-
ilshed con1mission of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
fixed at () 1r of the sale price of the property the sa1ne 
as if it had been sold by the Plaintiff. By the rules and 
regulations of the Salt J_.Jake Real Estate Board such 
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fee is mandatory upon its members and any deviation 
therefrom subjects a realtor to penalty or expulsion. 
The Defendant appeals from the aforesaid judg-
ment of the trial court asserting that the agreement is 
void and unenforceable in violation of the Utah Con-
stitution and Sections 50-1-6 and 50-1-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Further, it is void and unenforceable 
in that the commission fixed under the contract con-
stitutes the payment of a penalty without relation to 
actual loss or damage suffered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SALES AGENCY CONTRAC'f IS 
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE IN THAT IT 
CONTRAVENES SECTIONS 50-1-6 AND 50-
1-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AND 
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 20, UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
Section 50-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows : 
"Combinations to control prices forbidden. 
Any combination by persons having for its ob-
ject or effect the controlling of prices of any 
professional services, any products of the soil, 
any articles of 1nanufacturing or commerce, or 
the cost of exchange or transportation is pro-
hibited and declared unla,vful." 
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Section 50-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
~'Any contract or agreement in violation of 
this chapter shall be absolutely void." 
'rhe contract upon which the claim of Plaintiff is 
predicated states as to any sale of property by the 
o\vner: "I agree to pay you the commission recom-
mended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board for such 
sale or exchange. At the time of the sale herein the duly 
established commission fixed by the Board was 6ro of 
the sale price. The levying of such commission on the 
part of realtor members of the Board was and is man-
datory. Failure to so charge subjects members to 
penalty or expulsion or other disciplinary measures. The 
Board is a combination of persons and it is certain one 
of its objects and effects is to fix and establish and 
control pre-determined prices for services of realtors 
without regard to actual value of such services or any 
individual criteria in each instance. The uniform listing 
contract upon which the Plaintiff sues is, as to commis-
sion sought, the result and effect of a combination of 
pers<?ns having as their object the controlling of fees 
for services. The aforesaid Utah Code Sections were 
dra\vn expressly to preclude recovery by reason of such 
agreements, actions and conduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Zions 
Service Corp. vs. H. A. Danielson, 12 U. 2d 369, 366 
P 2d 982, considered the above sections with respect 
to an agreement by masonry contractors under which 
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they established predetermined prices for estimating 
services which were to be used jointly by all members 
and the costs of which were to be passed on to third 
parties who dealt with the members. The Defendant 
refused to pay its membership fees for the services 
afforded and the Plaintiff sued to recover same. The 
Defendant argued as to this suit that the agreement 
upon which the claim was based was void and unen-
forceable as a violation of Sections 50-1-1 and 50-1-6 
of the Utah Code and constituted an unlawful restraint 
of trade. The Court held in favor of the Defendant, 
holding that the agreement sued upon was void. The 
case at hand is virtually on all fours with the Zions 
Service Corp. case as to the principal involved. In both 
the Plaintiff seeks or sought recovery on the basis of 
an agreement of members who in concert pre-deter-
mined prices for services of the members in dealings 
with third parties. It is submitted the same result 
should be reached in this case, namely the agreement 
is in violation of Utah Statute and therefore is void 
and unenforceable. In both cases free competition is 
diminished when payrnents for services are controlled 
by the concerted action of a group in a common line of 
business. Further, in both the fee was fixed for services 
as a percentage of the total amount in the bid or the 
sale and when applied in the Zions case, the Court 
found it to be an unreasonable restraint of trade and 
in violation of the law. In this case the inevitable result 
of the uniform listing agreement is to diminish free and 
open competition in the services offered to the public for 
the sale of real estate. 
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1\nother matter involving the validity and enforce-
ability of a contract which operated in restraint of 
trade \Vas considered by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Gamtnon vs. Federated Milk Producers Assn., Inc., 
360 P 2d 1018, II U 2d 421. There the Defendant 
had exclusive agency agreements with third parties for 
the purpose of selling at fixed prices, all milk of such 
parties in the Salt Lake area. Plaintiff entered into 
an agreement with Defendant to transport such milk. 
In addition the Plaintiff also hauled milk to independ-
ent dairies in Salt Lake which were not covered by the 
Defendant's agency pact. During the trial the Plaintiff 
urged that the contract between the Defendant and the 
third parties was a combination in restraint of trade 
and was void as a violation of Utah's anti-trust statutes. 
l''he Supreme Court held that the Defendant in fixing 
prices in concert "rith others had contravened Article 
XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution and accord-
ingly the agency contract was void and said agreement 
could not be set up as a defense by the Defendant 
against Plaintiff's cause of action. 
If an agreement in restraint of trade is not valid 
as a defense, likewise it is not valid as the basis of a 
cause of action. 
Also probative and closely in point is a decision 
rendered in Plymouth Dealer's Assn. of Northern 
C.alifornia vs. U. S., 279 F. 2d 128. There the Dealer's 
.~ssociation established, printed and published a price 
list for vehicles. '".fhis was circulated to its members to 
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control values in sales to third parties. The United 
States brought an action against the Association for 
violation of anti-trust statutes. ,-fhe Court held the 
fixing of prices and the publishing of lists for sales 
control was a violation of such statutes and was an 
improper restraint of trade. The Defendant's assertion 
that its dealer members cut prices in bidding against 
each other or competed in other ways was held not to 
obviate the existence of an illegal restraint of trade. In 
the case at hand the Real Estate Board has done exactly 
what the Automobile Dealers Association did, namely 
it fixed prices for services or a commodity and both are 
Improper. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS IN THE SALES 
AGENCY CON'fRACT PROVIDING F 0 R 
AUTO~IATIC PAYl\1ENT TO THE REAL-
'I'OR OF A 6ro CO:\I~IISSION, IF THE O'VNER 
SELLS HIS PROPERTY HIMSELF DURING 
THE AGENCl"'" PERIOD IS AN AGREEMENT 
FOR THE PAYMENT OF A PENALTY AND 
IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
The record in the instant matter discloses that 
Plaintiff's expenditure of time or money in efforts to 
sell Defendant's property was negligible and incon-
sequential when compared to the commission sued for 
of $4,950.00 plus $709.33 in attorney fees. In this 
regard the testi1nony of Salesman Howes for the Plain-
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tiff, beginning on Page "27 of the transcril>t, shows that 
approxitnately four or fi,re days of total time was ex-
pended in conferring 'vith some five pr~spective pur-
chasers. An advertisement of about one inch in length 
was run in a daily newspaper for four days on two 
separate occasions. 'I' he cost of this was slightly in 
excess of $10.00. Further, Plaintiffs had a sign made 
and put on the property at the expenditure of approxi-
mately $20.00. Plaintiff admitted that no other salesmen 
took contacts to the property. 
It is obvious from the foregoing that the amount 
of the commission and the judgment thereon bears no 
reasonable relation to the services rendered by the 
Plaintiff for and on behalf of the Defendant. Under 
the terms of the contract, even if the listing office per-
formed no services, it would be required to collect the 
full commission. Such an agreement which does not 
take into consideration any reasonable measure of 
damages for breach of the contract can only be con-
strued as providing for a penalty and the same is there-
fore void and unenforceable. It is not and cannot here 
be viewed as a liquidated damage for it is so grossly 
disproportionate to any actual service performed or 
value rendered that to require payment of same would 
be unconscionable. 
"fhis issue was considered by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 P 2d 404, 8 U 2d 
370. There the contract between the parties called for 
the payment of a sum certain in case of default. In its 
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holding the Court stated that contracts which call for 
the payment of a predetermined sum in the case of 
default are usually construed as agreements to pay 
penalties and not liquidated damages. '"fhe Court 
pointed out that contracts which call for forfeiture of 
amounts so grossly disproportionate to any actual 
damage that to enforce them would shock the con-
science are not enforceable as they constitute penalties. 
It is respectfully submitted that the sum to be paid 
in the instant matter in the case of default, which 
amounted to 6?o of the sale price of the property valued 
in excess of $100,000.00 is so greatly disproportionate 
to any actual or possible damage suffered by the Plain-
tiff that it amounts to a penalty and hence is unenforce-
able. 
So also was payment of a penalty found to be in-
volved by the Supreme Court in the case of Reed v. 
Armstrong, 312 P 2d 777, 6 U 2d 291. There the 
liability of Defendant for default was the payment of 
the sum of $1,000.00 on a specified date and to surrender 
enough stock at an agreed value to be the equivalent 
of a further sum of $1,000.00. The Court stated that 
the measure of da1nages for breach would ordinarily be 
the legal rate of interest allowable for nonperformance. 
The stipulated payment, however, was found to be an 
agreernent for payment of a penalty and unenforceable, 
even thoug·h no reference in the contract was made to 
liquidated damages or penalty. Likewise in the case, 
payment for services rendered by a realtor would ordi-
narily be the value of the services rendered. Instead, 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ho,vever, the lTniforin Real Estate Listing Agreement 
pro1nulgated by the Board for all affiliated realtors 
required the payment of 6lfo of the selling price of the 
property. With the property valued here at some 
$100,000.00 such percentage is so grossly dispropor-
tionate to any service afforded or likely to accrue as to 
eonstitute the payment of a penalty which should not 
be enforced. 
The proper view in these circumstances was cogently 
set forth in Jacobson vs. Swan, 278 P 2d 294, 3 U 2d 59. 
'fhere an action was brought under the Unlawful 
Detainer Statutes to procure possession of property 
sold initially under a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and to retain all payments made by Defendants under 
the contract in two subsequent leases in connection with 
the property. In holding with the Trial Court that this 
constituted a penalty that could not be enforced the 
Utah Supreme Court said, 
"It is established in this state that where a 
forfeiture provision allows an unconscionable 
and exhorbitant benefit to be retained by the 
seller, which bears no relationship to the damages 
sustained or reasonable contemplated, it provides 
for a penalty or punitive damages which courts 
of equity 'viii not enforce." 
Section 339, Restatement of Contracts, Liquidated 
Damages and Penalties states: 
" ( 1) An agreement made in a~ vance of 
breach. fixing the damages therefore, IS not en-
forceable as a contract and does not affect the 
11 
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damages recoverable for the breach, unless (a) 
the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of 
just compensation for the harm that is caused 
by the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused 
by the breach is one that is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation." 
It is submitted that the agreement in this case 
which determines in advance of breach on the part of 
the property owner making him liable for the payment 
of 6 ljo of his selling price if he sells the property himself 
is not an amount that is a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation to the realtor who makes negligible efforts 
at selling and who is put to very little expense as in 
this case. 
POINT III 
THE MEASURE OF LIABILITY OF THE 
OWNER OF· PROPERTY TO A REALTOR 
WITH 'VHOM THE PROPERTY WAS LIST-
ED \VHEN THE O'VNER SELLS THE 
P R 0 P E R 'I, Y HIMSELF DURING THE 
AGENCY LISTING PERIOD IS THE AC-
TUAL 'TALUE OF SER,riCES RENDERED 
BY 'l,HE REAL'l,OR. 
In this regard the case of Isern vs. Gordon, 273 
P 435, Kansas, 1929, should be considered. There a 
rea.! estate agent sued the owner of property to recover 
his comtnission for the breach by the owner of an exclu-
sive agency contract to sell his property when the owner 
sold it himself to a party not produced by the realtor. 
12 
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'l'he (,ourt stated the question of issue was the amount 
ot' compensation to be given the realtor for the breach, 
i.e .. 'vhether it is to be the cotntnission stated in the con-
tract "·hich was predicated upon the price received by 
the owner or is to be the damages incurred by the 
realtor in endeavors to procure a buyer? The commis-
sion on the sale would have been $300.00. The Court 
held the realtor was not entitled to the $300.00 or any 
predetermined commission but that he was entitled 
to actual damages for the owner's breach of contract 
and for time and money expended in efforts to find a 
buyer. 
The Yiew expressed by the Kansas Court is a proper 
one for application by the Court in this case. The testi-
mony of the Plaintiff as reflected in the record shows 
clearly that the Plaintiff's efforts were insubstantial 
prior to the sale by the owner. Testimony of the Plain-
tiff indicates no prospective buyers were being consid-
ered and efforts to locate same had virtually ceased. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the exclusive list-
ing agreement used by the Salt Lake City Real Estate 
Board and its members is in violation of the Restraint 
of Trade Statutes of the state as well as the Utah State 
Constitution. The provision of the contract for the 
payn1ent of a predetermined commission as applied to 
this case constitutes a penalty and therefore should not 
13 
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be enforced. The case should be remanded to the Dis-
trict Court to determine the reasonable and fair value 
of the services performed by the Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BUSHNELL & BEESLEY 
and JACK FAIRCLOUGH 
By Jack Fairclough 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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